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Abstract: The present paper sheds light on how growth of young firms is 
affected by expansive strategies and the socioeconomic heritage of their 
main actors. “Socioeconomic heritage” has to do with socialization, prior 
socioeconomic circumstances, and regional growth conditions; the term is 
elaborated upon and further defined in this study. The empirical analysis is 
carried out both for West Germany – a mature market economy – and for 
East Germany, which operated under a centrally planned economy until 
German reunification in 1990. The main finding of the paper is that the 
involvement of West Germans in East German start-ups has a favourable 
effect on these firms’ chances to grow rapidly. This effect is attributed to 
the fact that West Germans are more likely to possess person-related and 
situation-related factors necessary for growing a business in a market 
economy. The results are more ambiguous as to the influence of 
expansive strategies on fast growth. 
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1  Introduction 
The characteristics of fast-growing firms are a subject of great scientific 
interest recently (for an overview, see Henrekson and Johansson, 2008), 
because these so-called “gazelles” turn out to be conducive for regional 
development (Acs and Mueller, 2008). Thus, high-growth firms are also on 
top of the agenda of policy-makers (Smallbone et al., 2002; Fischer and 
Reuber, 2003). 
Several researchers surveyed diverse approaches related to the growth of 
newly founded firms and firm growth in general (see, e.g., You, 1995; 
Coad, 2007). Hart (2000) summarizes the different approaches. He 
discusses the neoclassical approach, models dealing with the role of scale 
economies and the minimum efficient size, models of imperfect 
competition, evolutionary approaches, and life-cycle models. Altogether, in 
the literature, it is generally agreed that the determinants of rapid growth 
can be divided into three types: (1) external factors, (2) internal factors, 
and (3) strategy (Storey, 1994). This paper focuses especially on the role 
of strategy. 
Strategic decision making in young and small firms is different from that 
process in larger organizations (Busenitz and Barney, 1997). The type of 
strategy employed by young firms is heavily influenced by the 
psychological makeup of the entrepreneur who started the venture. In this 
paper, an entrepreneur is defined as a “person or a very small group of 
persons which is in control and which shapes the firm and its future” 
(Wennekers and Thurik, 1999). 
However, a firms’ success may not be entirely dependent on the individual 
characteristics of the entrepreneur. According to the network approach to 
entrepreneurship, social context plays an important role in the success of 
a venture (Aldrich and Zimmer, 1986). Thus, in this paper, an analysis of 
strategies related to growth ambition and attitude with an investigation of 
the social context within which the entrepreneur is embedded is combined. 




It is hypothesized that the economic system within which a person is 
socialized will have an impact on that persons probability of running a new 
business successfully. More specifically, it seems entirely likely that there 
will be a difference between an entrepreneur who grew up in a market 
economy and one who grew up in a planned economy. Germany is the 
perfect environment within which to test this idea. At the time of German 
reunification in 1990, West Germany, the Federal Republic of Germany 
(FRG), was already an established market economy, but East Germany, 
the former socialist German Democratic Republic (GDR), was at that time 
deeply marked by 40 years of central planning. 
The GDR underwent a transition from a centrally planned to a market 
economy in the course of its unification with the FRG. Due to the decline 
of state-owned enterprises maintained under a communist regime, the role 
of entrepreneurs during transition was of crucial importance for industrial 
restructuring, employment creation, and increases in innovative capability 
and competition (Smallbone and Welter, 2001). The GDRs transition to a 
market economy is especially interesting because the unique event of 
reunification and the immediate adoption of a market economy in East 
Germany distinguishes it from other transition countries in Eastern Europe 
(Brezinski and Fritsch, 1995). The existence of different economic systems 
until 1990 in the two Germanys and the transition of the GDR resulted in 
different regional growth regimes in East and West Germany in the 
aftermath of reunification (Fritsch, 2004). 
In short, West and East Germans have different social and economic 
backgrounds, or different “socioeconomic heritages”, the term used in this 
paper. These differences are expected to have an effect on the ability to 
run a new business successfully and on the role of expansive business 
strategies. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. First, a theoretical framework and 
the main hypotheses are presented (2). Then, the data are introduced (3), 
after which follows a discussion of the results (4). The paper concludes 
with a summary of the main findings (5). 




2  Theoretical Framework 
2.1  The role of socioeconomic heritage in Germany 
For this study, the concept of socioeconomic heritage needs to be 
understood in the context of the historical background of the FRG and the 
GDR, but in principal the context applies on a general level. The FRG was 
integrated into the Western world after World War II, whereas the GDR 
was made part of the Eastern bloc. In 1990, the year of the German 
reunification, the former GDR adopted the Western-style market economy 
system, which was a radical transition and involved vast structural change. 
In its final stages, the GDR suffered economic decline, had a much lower 
productivity than the FRG, and was burdened with an outmoded industrial 
structure (see, e.g., van Ark, 1995; Blum and Dudley, 2000). Since 
reunification economic convergence between West and East German 
regions has not yet been achieved and is, indeed, progressing very slowly 
(Kronthaler, 2005; Hall and Ludwig, 2006). It seems that 40 years of 
socialism are not so easily forgotten, and one of the results is a regional 
growth regime quite different from that prevailing in the western part of the 
country (Fritsch, 2004). The concept of regional growth regime 
encompasses region-specific factors such as “sticky” regional knowledge 
stock, regional industrial structures and the underlying technological 
regimes, and the density of economic activity (Audretsch and Fritsch, 
2002; Fritsch, 2004). 
To be more precise, the GDR had been isolated from knowledge flows of 
the Western world. Therefore, the stock of knowledge available in the East 
German economy was vastly different from that in West Germany at the 
time of reunification (Fritsch, 2004). The industrial mix in East Germany 
was shaped by the restructuring process that occurred in the early 1990s. 
This was a process characterised by a top-down transformation, the 
privatisation of state-owned enterprises, as well as by a bottom-up 
transformation, the emergence of new businesses (Brezinski and Fritsch, 
1995). Many of the former state-owned enterprises were bought up by 




West German companies. Frequently, these firms were then either closed 
or integrated into the West German companies as subsidiary plants, often 
referred to as “extended workshop benches” (Hall and Ludwig, 1995). 
Furthermore, many of the state-owned enterprises simply collapsed due to 
low productivity and competitiveness compared to West German 
enterprises. The restructuring process set free a lot of workforce that could 
not be absorbed by new business formation (Fritsch, 2004), even though 
there had been quite a remarkable spate of entrepreneurial activity in East 
Germany in the early 1990s (Welter, 2007). Both these trends – shrinking 
of old state-owned units and increased entrepreneurial activity – are 
typical of Eastern European countries that underwent transition (see, e.g., 
Smallbone and Welter, 2001). Altogether, East Germany experienced a 
sharp rise of unemployment in the course of industrial restructuring. 
However, differences between West and East Germany are not restricted 
to the macro level, but also manifest in individual ability to cope with 
modes of exchange and production in a market economy. One example of 
this is the division of labour in the GDR, which was organized to a high 
degree within firms and private households rather than between them. 
Thus the average firm size was much bigger than in West Germany 
(Fritsch, 2004). Moreover, the GDR regime often directed investments in 
technology and capital, as well as labour inputs, towards priority sectors, 
while other parts of the economy had been neglected at the same time 
(Sleifer, 2006). Moreover, production normally took place in large 
vertically-integrated state-owned combines set up in accordance to the 
targets of the central planners (Bannasch, 1990). Private sector activities 
were mainly restricted to handicraft and retailing. Therefore Immediately 
after German reunification, the overall rate of self-employment in the 
former GDR was only about 2.2 percent in relation to the whole workforce 
(Pickel, 1992). 
As a consequence, East Germans had only limited experience with or skill 
in running a firm. For example, the role model of parental success in self-
employment, which is of crucial importance to the choice of it (Dunn and 




Holtz-Eakin, 2000), simply did not exist for East Germans, and they could 
fall back only on a very limited family tradition of entrepreneurship (Utsch 
et al., 1999). Moreover, experiences with running a business within the 
institutional framework of a market economy, by definition, did not exist. 
Empirical studies show that more than half of the private firms of the GDR 
broke down in the early 1990s, due to problems to adapt (Thomas, 1996). 
Complicating and worsening this lack of familiarity with entrepreneurship, 
was a certain rather negative mental attitude towards entrepreneurship 
due to anti-capitalist indoctrination and socialist idealism in the GDR 
(Lechner and Pfeiffer, 1993; Utsch et al., 1999). Starting a firm in East 
Germany immediately after reunification was often viewed as a “heroic 
task” (Thomas, 1996). Thus, one may think that East Germans have a 
lower ability to percept new business opportunities, because distinct 
cognitive properties, which originate from social interactions in the market, 
and experience-based understanding of user and customer needs are 
necessary to identify, value, and exploit such opportunities (Shane and 
Venkataraman, 2000; Levie and Autio, 2008). Differences regarding 
attitude to entrepreneurship and perception of opportunities are in line with 
the socialization hypothesis of post materialism. This hypothesis assumes 
that someones values reflect to a great extent the prevailing 
circumstances during ones formative years and was applied to 
entrepreneurship by Uhlaner and Thurik (2007).  
By comparison with East Germans, West Germans are much better 
situated to be successful entrepreneurs and to access markets. As 
discussed above, most East Germans lacked the skill and experience 
necessary for running a business in a market economy. Moreover, East 
Germans usually have fewer financial resources for starting and growing a 
business due to lower saving rates during the GDR period, which is a 
typical characteristic of a planned economy (Fritsch, 2004).  
The East Germans lack of network relations that can ease market access 
is a more serious handicap, and one not so easily overcome as the 
financial one, as constructing networks takes more time than accumulating 




financial resources. This situation, too, is related to the transition process. 
The institutional framework of the market economy in East Germany did 
not evolve endogenously; rather, its introduction in the course of 
reunification was more in the nature of an exogenous shock (see, e.g., 
Hall and Ludwig, 1995; Brezinski and Fritsch, 1995). Due to the GDRs 
isolation behind the Iron Curtain, East Germans almost by definition were 
unable to build network relations within the institutions of West Germany 
until 1989. The GDR economy actually did have network ties and trade 
relationships with Eastern Europe and its markets, but these network ties 
weakened and the trade relationships collapsed in the early 1990s due to 
rising prices, which occurred in the course of the German currency union 
(Brezinski and Fritsch, 1995), and the increasing costs of production in 
East Germany due to hard bargaining by the unions (Sinn, 2002). 
The differences between East and West Germans in experience, skills, 
attitude, financial resources, and network links clearly reflect their different 
socioeconomic heritages. Socioeconomic heritage is defined in the 
present study as a set of person-related factors learned through 
socialization in a specific economic system or affected by situation-related 
factors, like modes of exchange and production in these systems. 
Additionally, characteristics of specific regional growth regimes that are 
related to prior socioeconomic circumstances preserve this heritage. The 
idea of socioeconomic heritage is related to recent research that 
emphasizes the role of socialization for entrepreneurial issues (see, e.g., 
Uhlaner and Thurik, 2007). In the case of West and East Germany, the 
importance of socioeconomic heritage can be seen as rooted in the 
persistence of different regional growth regimes in both parts of the 
country (Fritsch, 2004). In the present study it is argued that this heritage 
explains the ability to make a firm growing. In a broader sense it may also 
help to explain the ability and likelihood to start a firm. Empirical findings 
reveal that entrepreneurial activities decline more sharply with increases in 
age in East European countries with a socialist legacy (Estrin and 
Mickiewicz, 2009). Obviously older individuals should contain a 
socioeconomic heritage stronger shaped by the socialist past. However, 




starting a firm and growing it are two different things and should not be 
mixed up.
 2   
From the discussion above, it is expected that West Germans are better 
equipped than East Germans to manage and handle growth processes. It 
is difficult to compare the ability of West German entrepreneurs in West 
Germany with the ability of East German entrepreneurs in East Germany 
due to the prevalence of two completely different growth regimes in both 
parts of the country. To detect whether there are differences with regard to 
performance one region needs to be chosen. In this paper it is 
investigated whether those East German firms where there is some 
involvement by Westerners have better chances to achieve high growth 
rates than East German firms where there is no such involvement. 
According to the line of argumentation above there should be an effect. 
Thus, the main hypothesis of the paper is: 
(H1) East German young and small firms in which West Germans are 
involved to a considerable degree have a higher probability to belong to 
the group of fast growing firms. 
An analysis of firm growth needs to take into account the ambition to grow 
a firm. The strategy employed by firms at least partially explains ambitions. 
Further on, socioeconomic heritage and strategy are interrelated, which is 
elaborated in more detail in the following section. In the context of the 
present study, the role of strategic variables is likely to differ in East and 
West Germany. 
2.2  The role of strategy 
This section explores fruitful high growth strategies in the areas of 
technology and markets. The term strategy is employed broadly to include 
business practices that reflect growth aspirations. In the literature, strategy 
and business practices are each viewed as essential in explaining the 
growth of young and small businesses (for an overview, see, e.g., Storey, 
                                                 
2 The idea of an age relation is elaborated in more detail in another working paper in 
preparation. 




1994; Chrisman et al., 1998; Barringer et al., 2005). According to Storey 
(1994), strategic factors having an impact on fast growth include training, 
market positioning, technological sophistication, state support, and 
exporting. Barringer et al. (2005) state that customer knowledge, product 
superiority, advanced technology, innovation, and research and 
development are key business practices that differentiate between rapid 
growth firms and slow growth firms. Chrisman et al. (1998) provide a 
detailed classification of strategy and business practices that considers 
planning and strategy formulation, goals and objectives, strategic 
direction, entry strategy, competitive weapons, segmentation, scope, 
investment strategy, and political strategy. In the present study the focus is 
on technology, state support, and exporting. 
Advanced technology can be important in creating superior goods. 
Superior products and services in turn contribute to rapid growth, albeit 
somewhat indirectly, by easing market entry and providing a basis of 
differentiation (Barringer et al., 2005). It thus seems likely that a new 
venture can successfully challenge incumbents if it employs state-of-the-
art production technology. The same should be true, although perhaps to 
a lesser extent initially, for a new venture that invests in itself to reach the 
technological frontier (Voulgaris et al., 2005). 
However, producing at the technological frontier could mean more capital-
intensive production (Bellmann et al., 2003). This type of strategy should 
become more pronounced in situations of state support, such as high 
availability of investment and capital subsidies. 
Public subsidies can be a way of safeguarding growth because these 
programs may reduce transaction costs for the firms (Shane, 2002). It is 
also possible that, for instance, the provision of information and advice 
enhances the human capital of entrepreneurs (Fayolle, 2000; Delmar and 
Shane, 2003), which, in turn, might be conducive for high growth. 
In East Germany, there is evidence that investment subsidies crowd out 
labour. Labour-saving production modes became profitable in the 1990s 




due to massive capital subsidizing after German reunification (Snower and 
Merkl, 2006). Therefore, the impact of technology, as well as the influence 
of capital and investment subsidies, should be less important to high 
growth in terms of employment in East Germany at least in part because 
of the diminishing marginal utility of the subsidies. In contrast to capital 
subsidies, wage subsidies are expected to have a positive effect in both 
parts of the country simply because they are more often directly related to 
additional employment. Therefore, the following hypotheses emerge: 
(H2) Wage subsidies and investment have a positive effect on the 
probability to belong to the group of fast growing firms in both East and 
West Germany. 
(H3a) The employing of state-of-the-art technology has a positive effect on 
the probability to belong to the group of fast growing firms in West 
Germany but is less important in East Germany. 
(H3b) Capital and investment subsidies have a positive effect on the 
probability to belong to the group of fast growing firms in West Germany 
but are less important for that probability in East Germany. 
With respect to exporting, it is commonly believed that export-oriented 
firms have stronger growth aspirations and growth ambitions (Kolvereid 
and Bullvag, 1996; Wiklund and Shepherd, 2003). Small firms may see 
expansion abroad as a means of compensating for declining local markets 
and thus look for both growth and cost-reduction opportunities (Aharoni, 
1966; Rabino, 1980). The ability to sell products and services abroad is at 
least to some extent dependent on their quality (Storey, 1994). Export-
oriented firms are generally more productive, more innovative, and more 
efficient than non-exporting firms (Clerides et al., 1998; Kneller and Pisu, 
2007). Moreover, exporting firms have access to new knowledge and 
technology (Yeoh, 2004), which can be used to develop to further enhance 
their value and skills (Zahra and George, 2002; Barkema and Vermeulen, 
1998). Therefore, export-oriented firms should have better prospects for 
growth. 




Socioeconomic heritage may play a role in a firms export orientation. The 
former GDR was not only economically and politically integrated into the 
Eastern bloc (Fritsch, 2004), but its whole society, too. In short, the GDRs 
identity was formed to a large degree by prevailing norms and values of its 
alliance partners (Hogwood, 2000) and East Germans were mentally 
attuned and accustomed to relationships and networks within Eastern 
Europe. 
The increased price of East German products in the aftermath of the 
German currency union, combined with hard bargaining on the part of 
unions, led to a severe decline of the trade volume of East German 
enterprises with its former communist trade partners (Fritsch, 2004). East 
Germans starting a business after reunification necessarily had to shift 
their focus to the West if they wanted to grow beyond the limited local 
market. According to Brixy and Kohaut (1999), in view of the peculiarities 
of the East German markets, it can be claimed that a start-up there can be 
thought of as having an export orientation if the start-up “exports” products 
and services to a considerable degree at least to West Germany. This 
illustrates the difficulty for East Germans to enter even the West German 
market. 
Therefore, it is hypothesized that those East German firms that did 
manage to enter the Western European markets are very productive and 
competitive. Thus, it is expected that an export orientation should have a 
more pronounced effect on rapid growth in East Germany than it does in 
West Germany. 
(H4) Export orientation has a positive effect on the probability to belong to 
the group of fast growing firms and this effect is more pronounced in East 
Germany than in West Germany. 




3  Research design 
3.1  Sample 
The databases used in this study are the IAB Establishment Panel (IABE) 
and the Establishment History Panel (EHP), provided by the Institute for 
Employment Research (IAB). The IABE collects data about general firm 
characteristics, employment structures, productivity, investment, business 
policy, education and further education, wage policy, industrial relations, 
and public support. The IABE has been conducted since 1993 for West 
Germany and since 1996 for East Germany, with the number of 
participating establishments increasing over time. The 2006 cross-section 
includes 9,856 West German and 5,593 East German establishments. The 
sample is stratified by 17 industries and 10 firm-size ranges and is 
extracted from the Establishment File of the German Social Insurance 
Statistics, which covers every German establishment having at least one 
employee subject to social insurance (Fischer et al., 2008). 
A new venture was included in this analysis if it is an original, non-
subsidiary start-up and five years old. The age criterion was chosen 
because it generally takes a young firm four to six year to overcome the 
initial problems of surviving in the market (Acs and Mueller, 2008). 
Subsidiaries of large, already established firms have been removed from 
the sample because, obviously, they are not really start-ups. 
To identify start-up dates, data from the EHP were used. This data source 
contains all establishments that employ or employed at least one person 
subject to social insurance on June 30 of a given year. Data are available 
for every year since 1975 (Spengler, 2007). 
The year of start-up was taken from the questionnaire used in the IABE 
survey. If the year given in response to the questions was the same as the 
one in which the venture appeared for the first time in the EHP, the 
amount of employment in the alleged start-up year was taken from the 
EHP plus one. When the answer given to the IABE question was a year 




before the first EHP appearance, the amount of employees subject to 
social insurance was set to one for the start-up year.
3 If the start-up 
employment exceeded 30 employees, the observations were excluded. 
Bigger start-ups are in general not original start-ups (Fritsch and Brixy, 
2004). At the time this research was conducted, IABE data on the 
exogenous variables were available for the years 1996 to 2005. Thus, 
start-ups of the years 1991, being five years in the market in 1996, to 
2000, being five years in the market in 2005, were investigated. The start-
ups can be identified in the EHP and the IABE by the establishment 
number.
4 The identified observations from the cross-sections 1996 to 2005 
were merged together. Growth was measured by the amount of 
employment five years after start-up. Further refinements regarding 
strategies, public involvement and industries were carried out. 
Successful outsourcing strategies shrink employment levels but because a 
smaller number of employees in this case is not actually indicative of firm 
performance. Firms that engaged in organizational changes involving in- 
and outsourcing were removed from the sample. Public enterprises were 
excluded as well, because their motivation for being in business is usually 
far removed from the reasons served by private enterprise. The high ratio 
of self-employed persons in the farming and forestry sector implies a high 
probability of underestimating the level of start-up activity in this sector 
(Blanchflower, 2000) and for this reason it was also removed from the 
sample. Due to the very low number of entities (in the database)
5 engaged 
in the energy, mining, and banking and insurance sectors, these industries 
were also not considered. Another problem has to do with wage subsidies. 
There are schemes designed to directly support individuals. Individual 
wage subsidies are not related to the firm and disturb the estimations. 
                                                 
3 An amount of zero cannot be used with respect to the applied growth measures. Thus, 
one employee is added for every venture in the sample to avoid inconsistencies. 
4 Unfortunately, the appearance of a new establishment number does not necessarily 
indicate a new business formation (for details, see Fritsch and Brixy, 2004). Some 
adjustments are made in the present analysis to deal with the problem. 
5 Fischer et al. (2008) suggest that every unit of analysis in cross-sections should contain 
at least 20 entities. The excluded sectors do not fulfil that criterion. 




Thus only firms that received wage subsidies at the firm level and firms 
that received no wage subsidies were included in the dataset. 
The final sample contains 813 East German firms and 529 West German 
firms. Of the East German firms, 81 can be viewed as fast-growing; in 
West Germany, 53 firms can be so defined (see the following section for 
the definition of fast-growing). 
3.2  Measurement 
In the literature there are several studies on employment growth in general 
using micro data for Germany (for an overview, see Bellmann et al., 2003). 
Brüderl and Preisendörfer (2000), as well as Almus (2002), investigated 
fast growth. Almus analyzed East and West German start-ups jointly; 
Brüderl and Preisendörfer restricted their analysis to the metropolitan area 
of Munich. Studies on general employment growth using data from the 
IABE have been conducted by Brixy and Kohaut (1999), Bellmann et al. 
(2003), and Heckmann and Schnabel (2006). 
In the present paper, rapid firm growth was measured by the employment 
change within firms. The analysis was restricted to employees who are 
subject to social insurance. Growth rates were calculated by comparing 
the number of employees in the year of start-up to the number five years 
later. Employment growth as a measure of performance has its 
weaknesses. It could be the result of wage subsidies instead of economic 
performance. Also, it could be that a firm is successful precisely because it 
employs persons not subject to social insurance or practices a flexible 
system of outside resources, in which case the firm will not show up in the 
data used for this analysis. Other studies used market shares, output, 
and/or profits and sales as a measure of economic growth (Delmar et al., 
2003). It may be that such indicators are better suited to evaluate 
performance, but such data are rarely available on large scale. 




For the calculations, the Birch index was used (Birch, 1987). B0 stands for 







B B Index Birch
n
n − = −  
Often, firms are counted as fast-growing if their growth rates reach the 
highest percentile of the distribution of growth rates in a special sample 
(Henrekson and Johansson, 2008) and this classification was followed in 
the analysis presented in this paper. 
It should be noted that using firm characteristics as explanatory variables 
is not without some ambiguity in that the characteristics could be a 
consequence rather than a cause of high growth rates (Storey, 1994). An 
alternative would be to investigate the characteristics of start-ups 
specifically. However, this is not a trouble-free approach either, as it could 
be that changes made shortly after start-up are responsible for the firm 
embarking on a long-term growth path, thus creating a biasing effect. 
Because of the mentioned different regional conditions in West and East 
Germany, it was necessary to construct two different datasets. The 
variables used to test the hypotheses are as follows. For the East German 
dataset, a dummy variable indicates whether the majority of ownership is 
held by West Germans or persons from abroad. The latter group was 
included because it was found in a previous study that East German firms 
controlled by foreigners have an approximately 60 percent higher 
productivity than other firms (Bellmann et al., 2002). A second variable 
reflects whether the firm is owned by a combination of East Germans and 
West Germans or persons from abroad, whereby no group is in majority. 
Such firms were regarded as possessing a combined pool of skills and 
experiences from owners who have different socioeconomic heritages. 
                                                 
6 A famous method proposed by Evans (1987) was tested but failed econometric 
sufficiency for the West German dataset. So the results are not reported here. 
 




The reference group consists of firms that are majority owned by East 
Germans. 
Thus, nothing can be said about the extent the owners also manage the 
small firm. But especially in small firms ownership and management are 
often not separated (O`Gorman et al., 2005). Furthermore the datasets 
were restricted to non-subsidiary original start-ups. So it can be concluded 
that an unfolding of skills and experience takes place. 
The strategy variables were used in both datasets. A firm with more than 5 
percent of its turnover occurring on markets abroad was counted as 
export-oriented. This characteristic was captured by a dummy variable. In 
their analysis of employment growth, Brixy and Kohaut (1999), using IABE 
data, counted establishments as export-oriented if they attained more than 
5 percent of their turnover in non-East German markets. Unfortunately, no 
information is available how much exactly is exported. 
Firms that declared that their production technology is “very new” were 
claimed to employ state-of-the-art technology or to have a high 
“technological status”.
7 One major obstacle in interpreting the variable 
regarding the state of technology is that the information relies on a self-
assessment, which could be biased. Other dummy variables indicate 
whether firms receive wage or capital and investment subsidies or made 
investments between the fourth and fifth year of their existence. 
3.3  Method 
A Probit model was employed for the regression analysis, where 1 
indicates that a firm is fast-growing, 0 otherwise. Robust estimators, which 
do not require a normal distribution of standard errors, were used (Huber, 
1967; White, 1980). To detect differences in the intensity of the impact the 
explanatory variables have on rapid growth, marginal effects are reported 
in this paper. 
                                                 
7 ”Technological Status“ is the term used by Brixy and Kohaut (1999) in their analysis. 




The data from the IABE are subject to a sample selection bias for two 
reasons: (1) the generally high failure rates of start-ups and (2) the under 
representation of very small firms (i.e., only firms with at least one 
employee subject to social insurance are in the panel) (Bellmann et al., 
2003). The first problem (1) is known as the survivor bias, and has to do 
with the fact that firms that start out larger in size are more likely to 
survive, a fact that has clear implications for this study as it uses firm size 
as an indication of economic growth. 
The survivor bias in the IABE data can be handled by using the two-step 
Heckman correction (Heckman, 1979), as described by Pfeiffer and Reize 
(2000). Thereby, only two time periods are taken into consideration. Some 
observations are represented in both periods; others appear only in one 
period. First, the probability that an observation is included in both periods 
is measured by using the data for the first period. The resulting Mills ratio 
(Mills, 1926) then must be regressed in the model for the growth 
estimation using data for the second period. When the Mills ratio is 
insignificant, there are no differences regarding the probability of fast-
growth between firms for which information on growth is available and 
firms for which such information is not available. However, implementing 
this procedure here is difficult because the start-up employment, the five-
year-later employment, and the employment from a common reference 
point (e.g., the three-year-later employment) are all needed. Unfortunately, 
only a small fraction of the observations in the sample have data at three 
different time points available. Indeed, the fraction is too small to allow any 
useful regression analysis and thus, when interpreting the empirical 
results, one has to keep in mind the survivor bias. The results are 
highlighted in the next section. 
 
 




4  Results 
4.1  Descriptive Results 
This section contains some descriptive statistics regarding the strategy 
and heritage variables. As can be seen in Table 1, there are some quite 
obvious differences between East and West Germany. 33.1 percent of the 
East German firms received investment and capital subsidies and 42.2 
percent received wage subsidies. In stark contrast, only 10.8 percent of 
the West German firms received the investment and capital subsidies and 
only 29.5 percent received wage subsidies. These data reflect the massive 
subsidizing of the East German economy after reunification. Another 
difference is the fraction of export-oriented firms: in the West German 
sample, 17.2 percent of the firms make more than 5 percent of their 
turnover on exports, whereas this figure is 7.1 percent for the East 
German firms, some proof that many East German firms do indeed have 
trouble accessing international markets. 
There are only minor differences in the other explanatory variables. For 
example, 24.2 percent of the firms in the West German sample regard 
their state of technology as “very new” while this holds for only 20.9 
percent of the East German sample. The percentage of East German firms 
that made investments is slightly lower than their West German 
counterparts (57.9 percent in the West compared to 54.8 percent in the 
East).  
Most of the East German firms in the sample are majority owned by East 
Germans. Only 10.6 percent of East German firms are majority owned by 
West Germans and only 0.7 percent are majority owned by foreigners. 
Firms in which neither East nor West Germans nor foreigners hold a 








Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for Strategy and Heritage Variables 
  Shares of Total 
Variable  East  West 
Majority Ownership:       
   East German  0.85    
   West German  0.11    
   Foreign  0.01    
   No Majority  0.04    
State-of-the-art Technology (Yes=1)  0.21  0.24 
Investment (Yes=1)  0.55  0.58 
Investment Subsidy (Yes=1)  0.33  0.11 
Wage Subsidy (Yes=1)  0.42  0.30 
Turnovers Abroad >5 percent (Yes=1)  0.07  0.17 
 
4.2  Multivariate analyses 
The regression results reporting marginal effects are shown in Table 2. 
Only the marginal effects corresponding to strategy and heritage are 
highlighted in the following paragraphs. 
The variable for the ownership structure has a significant effect. Those 
ventures majority owned by West Germans or foreigners have a higher 
probability for fast growth compared to ventures where East German 
owners are in the majority. East German firms appear to improve their 
growth chances if West Germans participate in the firm to a considerable 
degree, which confirms the hypothesis that the socioeconomic heritage 
matters! The marginal effect is about 4 percent. However, it is not possible 
to discover whether this favourable effect is due to the better access of 
West Germans to markets abroad, networks or to their experience and 
skill. It should be noted that simply having West German or foreign 
owners, is not a guarantee of fast growth, because the dummy variable, 
which refers to firms where no one group holds a majority interest, has no 
significant effect on fast growth. It appears that it is the degree of 
participation, not just the fact of it that is necessary to reap this advantage. 
In the East German sample investment and capital subsidies have no 
effects on fast growth, whereas in the West German sample, such 
subsidies have a favourable effect. Indeed, West German firms that 




received such subsidies are more likely to be fast growing by 7 percent. 
This confirms the hypothesis that capital and investment subsidies have a 
less pronounced effect on fast growth in East Germany due the massive 
public support policy in East Germany after reunification. Nevertheless, 
the only interpretable result is that firms that received such subsidies are 
less likely to be rapidly growing firms. No assertion is made about 
employment growth in general. 
Wage subsidies and investment have a positive significant effect on rapid 
growth in both datasets, as expected. The marginal effects are 5.6 percent 
for wage subsidies in East Germany and 12.3 percent in West Germany, 
and for investment 4.3 percent in East and 4.1 percent in West Germany. 
However, it should be remembered that this study counts only general 
wage subsidies on the firm level. 
The coefficient of the variable that indicates whether the firm produces 
with a very new technology is slightly negative but insignificant in both 
datasets. Therefore, the hypothesis that state-of-the-art technology plays a 
more important role in West Germany cannot be confirmed. 
Export orientation has no impact on fast growth. Serving foreign markets 
does not benefit rapid growth, at least not in terms of employment. 
Therefore, the hypothesis that export orientation will have a positive effect 
on fast growth, especially in East Germany, cannot be confirmed. This 
result should be interpreted cautiously, however, because the 5 percent-
minimum turnover attained abroad requirement for being counted as 
export-oriented is quite low. Nevertheless, it is difficult to use higher 
minimums due to the low percentage of firms that exceed the 5 percent-
criterion (7.1 percent compared to 17.2 percent in West Germany). 
Control variables, which refer to different general external and internal 
characteristics, are included in the analysis along with the heritage and 
strategy variables (see Table A.1 for descriptive statistics). 




The most important results regarding these variables are that the control 
for the start-up year reveals effects related to the East German transition. 
East German firms founded between 1995 and 1997 have a significantly 
lower probability of being fast-growing ventures compared to firms set up 
in 1991. This can be explained by the “window of opportunity” that opened 
in the early 1990s when there was limited competition and a lot of market 
opportunities due to the shortage of certain goods and, especially, 
services in the GDR economy accompanied by an increasing consumer 
demand for the same (see, e.g., Utsch et al., 1999; Almus, 2002).  
A variable indicating a firms location in a county bordering West Germany 
was included for the East German sample. Firms in these areas may be 
able to serve parts of the neighbouring West German local markets 
because of the on average lower costs of production in East Germany 
(Brixy and Kohaut, 1999). This variable turns out to be significant: firms 
located near West Germany enjoy favourable conditions for fast growth. 
 
Table 2. Results for regressions with being in the top 10 percent in terms of employment 
growth as dependent variable 
 
   East Germany      West Germany  
Variable  dF/dx  z     dF/dx  z 
                 
Heritage Variables           
Majority Ownership           
  (East German)            
  West German/ Foreign   .0401   2.09*       
  No majority   .0424   1.11       
Strategy Variables           
State-of-the-art Technology (Yes=1)  -.0019  -0.16     .0085   0.41 
Investment (Yes=1)   .0434   2.88**     .0408   2.04* 
Investment Subsidy (Yes=1)   .0203   1.50     .0697   2.17* 
Wage Subsidy (Yes=1)   .0566   3.72**     .1232   3.34** 
Turnovers Abroad >5 percent (Yes=1)   .0374   1.53     .0260   1.16 
Control Variables           
ln(start-up size)^2  -.0051  -1.99*    -.0046  -1.43 
Population Density:           
   (Agglomeration)           
   Urbanized   .0019   0.14     .0216   1.03 
   Rural  -.0071  -0.43     .0001   0.01 




Industry Affiliation:           
   (Retailing)           
   Manufacturing         .1288   2.68** 
      Raw Material Manufacturing   .0916   2.43*       
      Investment Good Manufacturing  -.0087  -0.44       
      Consumption Good Manufacturing   .0111   0.30       
   Construction  -.0062  -0.29     .0596   1.14 
   Transportation  -.0009  -0.02     .1283   1.68 
   Business Services  -.0038  -0.16     .1058   2.34** 
   Consumer Services  -.0094  -0.42     .1317   2.87* 
Increasing Expected Turnover (Yes=1)   .0504   3.23**     .0699   3.33** 
Limited Liability (Yes=1)   .0805   4.61**     .0876   3.66** 
Multiple Proprietors (Yes=1)   .0043   0.31      .0246   1.27 
Start-up in:                         
(1991)           
1992   .0017   0.08       
1993  -.0076  -0.39       
1994  -.0237  -1.27       
1995  -.0354  -2.13*       
1996  -.0426  -3.04**       
1997  -.0365  -2.45*       
1998   .0036   0.14       
1999  -.0215  -1.04       
2000  -.0312  -1.69       
Start-up between:            
(1991-1993)           
1994-1996        -.0286  -1.20 
1997-2000        -.0172  -0.77 
Border County (Yes=1)   .0567   2.52*       
Share of Qualified Workers   .0407   1.66     .0415   1.28 
Wage Agreement (Yes=1)  -.0002  -0.02    -.0287   1.27 
Constant    -5.97**      -6.79** 
           
Pseudo R^2     0.2725       0.2479  
Number of Observations    813      529 
             
Source:   IAB Establishment Panel 
dF/dx:  
discrete change of dummy variable from 0 
to 1 
*:    significant at 95 percent level 
**:  significant at 99 percent level 
():   reference group 
 
   




5  Concluding Remarks 
This paper investigates fast growth of young firms, with a particular focus 
on the effects of socioeconomic heritage and expansive strategies. 
Socioeconomic heritage is defined to mean a set of person-related factors 
learned through to socialization in a specific economic system or affected 
by situation-related modes of exchange and production within these 
systems, in this case, either a market or a planned economy. These 
factors include, among others, skill, experience, attitude, and network 
links. Specific regional growth regimes conserve this heritage. The 
analysis was carried out for German start-ups between 1991 and 2000. 
Germany is particularly well suited for such an analysis because of its 
division into two German states, with different economic systems, between 
1949 and 1990. The Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) in the West 
adopted a Western-style market economy; the German Democratic 
Republic (GDR) in the East operated under a Soviet-style centrally 
planned economy. 
It could be expected that in a market economy, which is now the system in 
both parts of Germany since reunification in 1990, start-ups run by 
persons socialized in the FRG will have better prospects for fast growth 
compared to those firms shaped by persons who grew up in the former 
GDR. West Germans have a greater ability to manage growth processes 
because they have been exposed to the market economy system since 
childhood, whereas the East Germans grew up under a completely 
different economic system. 
The results of this paper reveal that those young non-subsidiary firms that 
are majority owned by West Germans are more likely to be rapidly 
growing. In small firms especially ownership and management are often 
not separated. Therefore, the results confirm that firms managed by West 
Germans have an advantage in terms of fast growth. 
Training and further education targeted at nascent and established East 
German entrepreneurs, managers, and business owners with the aim of 




enhancing their ability to manage growth processes, by provision of skills 
required to grow a firm (for details, see Honig, 2004), could be a step 
towards levelling the playing field. Similar programs could be useful in 
transition countries in Eastern Europe to overcome obstacles related to 
socioeconomic heritage to stimulate the flourishing of rapidly growing 
firms, which are important job creators. Despite this, the engagement of 
West European managers and entrepreneurs in businesses started by 
East European locals or the participation of West European entrepreneurs 
in a team start-up together with locals might raise the growth prospects of 
these ventures. This possibility seems to be worthwhile to discuss against 
the background of the growing relations of economic actors from Eastern 
and Western Europe since the Eastern Enlargement of the European 
Union. 
This study investigated also certain strategies associated with growth 
ambitions in Germany, including export orientation, technology, and 
investment, as well as looking at the role of subsidies, resulting in the 
following general and specific conclusions.  
Policies aimed at creating “gazelles” in an effort to solve the high 
unemployment problem in East Germany should not overemphasize public 
support schemes, especially capital and investment subsidies, for which 
no positive effect on fast employment growth could be found. In addition, 
public support schemes should generally avoid disturbing market 
selection. This applies to investment and capital subsidies as well as to 
wage subsidies, although the latter type has a positive effect on growth in 
both data. Investment also has a favourable effect on the probability of 
being a fast-growing business. Therefore, a venture capital market 
capable and willing to fund such investment has to be kept functioning. 
Export orientation does not cause rapid growth in a systematic manner in 
either West or East Germany and neither does the state of technology. 
Being at the technological frontier does not affect rapid employment 
growth. 




The limitations of the study should be considered when interpreting the 
results. For example, sample selection bias could not be addressed here. 
Moreover, the variable indicating a firms state of technology was based on 
a self-assessment and could be biased. Also, a firm achieving 5 percent of 
its turnover abroad is considered as export-oriented, which is a rather low 
threshold, although justified by the difficulties East German firms face in 
entering foreign markets, as exemplified by the low percentage of firms in 
the sample exceeding this 5 percent-criterion (7.1 percent compared to 
17.2 percent in West Germany). 
More research on the strategies of new firms and their influence on growth 
is clearly warranted. This research should focus in much more detail on 
individual characteristics of the entrepreneur. A more detailed analysis of 
the effects of socioeconomic heritage of entrepreneurs would be a fruitful 
line of inquiry in understanding different paths of development of young 
firms. 
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Table A.1. Descriptive Statistics for control variables 
  Shares of Total 
Variable  East  West 
Industry Affiliation:       
   Raw Material Manufacturing  0.06  0.04 
   Investment Good Manufacturing  0.17  0.09 
   Consumption Good 
Manufacturing  0.04  0.05 
   Construction  0.21  0.14 
   Retailing  0.14  0.17 
   Transportation  0.03  0.04 
   Business Services  0.13  0.21 
   Consumer Services  0.21  0.27 
Start-up in:     
1991  0.24  0.05 
1992  0.10  0.05 
1993  0.09  0.11 
1994  0.09  0.11 
1995  0.12  0.13 
1996  0.12  0.11 
1997  0.08  0.12 
1998  0.04  0.07 
1999  0.06  0.09 
2000  0.06  0.15 
Population Density:     
   Agglomeration  0.22  0.57 
   Urbanized  0.32  0.25 
   Rural  0.47  0.18 
Border County (Yes=1)   0.15   
Increasing Expected Turnover 
(Yes=1)  0.24  0.32 
Multiple Proprietors (Yes=1)  0.22  0.28 
Wage Agreement (Yes=1)  0.25  0.36 
Limited Liability (Yes=1)  0.42  0.45 
Average Share of Qualified 
Workers  0.56  0.50 
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